

# **Do financial investors destabilize oil prices?**

**by**


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**The opinions expressed here are personal and not necessarily shared  
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***Energy Information Administration***  
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
# Motivation

- **Oil price** surged with increasing momentum between 2003-2008 before falling in the wake of the financial crisis and the subsequent economic downturn. After that, prices recovered again.
- Oil price increases came against the background of **surging demand** and **stagnating supply**.



# Financialization of oil

- The **financialization** of the oil futures market was also blamed: the number of open futures contracts more than tripled over period 2000 – 2008
- **Did financial activity drive up the price of oil?**  
Do we need stricter regulations on trading in the oil futures market?



# Policy-relevant questions

- 1. Has financialization distorted the pricing mechanism in futures markets?**
- 2. Does this transmit to spot prices?**
- 3. If so, should commodity futures markets be more regulated?**

# **WHAT'S EXACTLY FINANCIALIZATION?**

# Why derivatives?

- **Futures markets exists to transfer risk of oil price fluctuations**
- **2 types of traders**
  - **Commercial traders may want to hedge against price fluctuations by fixing the price they will pay or receive for delivery in the future**
  - **Also non-commercial traders enter the futures markets to achieve exposure to oil price risk and make a profit.**
- **The activity of non-commercial traders is usually defined as speculation**

# Does financial activity distort pricing?

## STABILIZING ACTIVITY



If trading is based on expected fundamentals, activity in the futures markets will make markets more liquid and allow information to be priced in immediately and efficiently

## DESTABILIZING ACTIVITY

Traders may distort efficient pricing in the futures markets only when they take positions that disregard (expected) fundamentals

# The role of index investment

- **Recently, banks have popularized commodity investment by marketing index funds**
- **Index funds trace popular commodity indexes with a passive strategy**
  - **They just go long and roll over contracts as the delivery date approaches**
- **Is this putting constantly upward pressure on prices?**



# Findings on the impact of index funds

- **Index investment does not cause changes in futures prices (Stoll and Whaley 2010)**
- **Index investment does not increase volatility (Irwin and Sanders 2010)**
- **Increase in commodity correlation due to hedge funds (Büyüksahin and Robe 2010)**
- **Index funds affect futures prices around roll-over dates (Mou 2010)**
- **Index investment increased commodity correlation (Tang and Xiong 2010)**
- **Index investment is affection prices beyond the short term (Singleton 2011)**

**Is this a data issue?**

# Our contribution

- **We evaluate the importance of financial activity in determining the spot price without explicitly using positions data**
- **We focus on shock to the futures market not linked to fundamentals**
  - **deviation from the no-arbitrage condition**
- **We use a structural VAR model with sign restrictions**
  - **Fundamental oil supply and demand-side shocks**
  - **Precautionary demand shock**
  - **Non-fundamental financial activity shock**

# THEORETICAL SETUP

# Spot and futures prices

- **Financial activity in the futures markets only matters if these traders can affect the spot price of oil**
- **Linkage between spot and futures market by a no-arbitrage condition (Pindyck 1994)**

$$P_t (1 + r_t)^\tau = F_{t,t+\tau} (1 + \Psi_{t,t+\tau})$$

**Spot oil price**

**Risk-free bond rate;  
Opportunity cost**

**Futures price;  
for delivery in  $t+\tau$**

**Convenience yield;  
additional benefit from  
having oil in storage**

# No-arbitrage condition

- ... or taking logs:

$$p_t + \tau r_t = f_{t,t+\tau} + \psi_{t,t+\tau}.$$

- Re-writing gives:

$$f_{t,t+\tau} = p_t - \psi_{t,t+\tau} + \tau r_t$$

- **This condition should hold if markets are efficient and arbitrage opportunities are instantaneously exploited.**

# Convenience yield


- **In turn, the convenience yield is:**

$$\psi_{t,t+\tau} = G[p_t, I_t, E(D_{t,t+\tau})]$$

- **spot oil price, inventories and expected oil fundamentals (Pindyck 1994)**
- **It is more beneficial to have oil inventories if**
  - **Oil spot price is higher**
  - **The current level of inventories is lower**
  - **Expected oil demand and supply are tighter**

# No-arbitrage futures price

- **Substituting the expression for the convenience yield gives...**


$$f_{t,t+\tau} = p_t - \psi_{t,t+\tau} + \tau r_t$$


$$f_{t,t+\tau} = p_t - G[p_t, I_t, E(D_{t,t+\tau})] + \tau r_t$$

- **The futures price in the no-arbitrage, efficient markets' case is solely dependent on current and expected fundamentals**

# Deviations from the no-arbitrage price

- **Destabilizing financial activity can distort efficient pricing if traders buy or sell futures based on reasons not related to (expected) fundamentals**
- **So the observed futures price can deviate from the no-arbitrage value:**

$$f_{t,t+\tau}^{\circ} = f_{t,t+\tau} + \epsilon_t^f$$


**Observed** futures price = **no-arbitrage** price + **DESTAB. FINANCIAL SHOCK**  
derived above                      which distorts efficient pricing

# The observed futures price

- **Substituting in the no-arbitrage futures price gives :**

$$f_{t,t+\tau}^{\circ} = p_t - G[p_t, I_t, E(D_{t,t+\tau})] + \tau r_t + \epsilon_t^f$$


- **The observed futures price is driven by:**
  - **Current and expected fundamentals**
  - **Destabilizing financial activity shock**

# Spot-futures spread

- **Rewriting this in terms of the futures–spot spread**

$$s_{t,t+\tau}^{\circ} = f_{t,t+\tau}^{\circ} - p_t = \underbrace{-G[p_t, I_t, E(D_{t,t+\tau})]}_{(1)} + \tau r_t \underbrace{+}_{(2)} \epsilon_t^f$$

- The spread is **negatively** affected by changes in current and expected fundamentals (also incl. stabilizing activity in futures markets) **(1)**
- The spread is **positively** affected by destabilizing financial shocks **(2)**
  - ...we can use this finding to uniquely identify the fundamental shocks from the non-fundamental financial activity shock in the data

# EMPIRICAL RESULTS

# Our Structural VAR

- **Estimation of an SVAR model for the global oil market:**

$$Y_t = c + A(L)Y_{t-1} + u_t$$

- **Global oil production**
  - **Oil spot price**
  - **World economic activity**
  - **Inventories**
  - **3-month oil futures price**
  - **(Futures-spot spread, defined within the model)**
- **Monthly data, over 1991M1-2010M2 with 12 lags**

# Identification

- **Disentangle different types of shocks that determine oil prices**
  - **Fundamental versus non-fundamental shocks**
  - **Different types of fundamental shocks**
- **We identify shocks using sign restrictions**
- **Non-fundamental shock = destabilizing financial activity shock**
- **Shocks to fundamentals = shocks to (current and expected) supply and demand**

# Oil supply shock

- E.g. supply disruptions

		$Q_{oil}$	$P_{oil}$	$Y_{wd}$	$INV_{oil}$	$F_{oil}$	$S_{F-P}$
		Oil production	Spot oil price	World econ. activity	Inventories	Oil futures price	Futures - spot spread
	Oil supply shock	<0	>0	<0		>0	<0
	Oil demand shock driven by economic activity						
	Oil-specific demand shock						
	Destab. financial shock						

# Economic activity shock

- E.g. strong growth of emerging economies

		$Q_{oil}$	$P_{oil}$	$Y_{wd}$	$INV_{oil}$	$F_{oil}$	$S_{F-P}$
		Oil production	Spot oil price	World econ. activity	Inventories	Oil futures price	Futures - spot spread
	Oil supply shock	<0	>0	<0		>0	<0
	Oil demand shock driven by economic activity	>0	>0	>0		>0	<0
	Oil-specific demand shock						
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# Oil demand shock

- E.g. oil-gas substitution shock


		$Q_{oil}$	$P_{oil}$	$Y_{wd}$	$INV_{oil}$	$F_{oil}$	$S_{F-P}$
		Oil production	Spot oil price	World econ. activity	Inventories	Oil futures price	Futures - spot spread
	Oil supply shock	<0	>0	<0		>0	<0
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	Oil-specific demand shock	>0	>0	<0		>0	<0
	Destab. financial shock						

# Destabilizing financial shock


- E.g. index funds?

		$Q_{oil}$	$P_{oil}$	$Y_{wd}$	$INV_{oil}$	$F_{oil}$	$S_{F-P}$
		Oil production	Spot oil price	World econ. activity	Inventories	Oil futures price	Futures - spot spread
	Oil supply shock	<0	>0	<0		>0	<0
	Oil demand shock driven by economic activity	>0	>0	>0		>0	<0
	Oil-specific demand shock	>0	>0	<0		>0	<0
	Destab. financial shock	?	?	?		>0	>0

# Response to fundamentals




# Response to financial activity




- **Some temporary effect on the spot price**
- **No effect on oil production, inventories or on economic activity**
- **The spread permanently increases**

# Variance decomposition

Oil spot price




Oil futures price



■ oil supply    ■ oil demand driven by econ. activity    ■ oil-specific demand    ■ other    ■ destabil. fin. activity

- **Fundamentals explain about 90% of oil price movements in the short run**
- **relevance of destabilizing financial activity is limited.**

# Historical decomposition



- **Financial activity exacerbated gyrations in the oil market**

# Conclusions

- **Financial activity can significantly destabilize spot prices in the short run**
- **Importance is limited in the long run and the pass-through is incomplete**
- **Trading according to (expected) oil fundamentals still explains about 90% of oil spot price movements**
- **Further regulating futures markets may reduce liquidity and risk-absorbing capacity in the oil futures market**
- **Something to look into: financial stability implications of index investment**